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This paper investigates questions regarding the saving rates by age brackets and 
aggregate savings, and then conducts a simulation analysis of the current account, from 
the I-S balances of households, corporations and the government.   
Saving rates of the old (65 years old and above) with publicly available data are high 
because of a selection bias in household head, that excludes the old living with younger 
family members and being non-head of the household. The paper estimates the true 
saving rates by age brackets rather than of household head's age brackets with taking 
the non-head households' member into account. Estimated saving rates of the old are 
still positive (about 10% to 20% which are less than those of the young) even after 
adjusting for the bias. The impact of aging on the aggregate saving rates will not be 
large if the future old people continue to save as the current old people.     
We forecast the current account in several scenarios, using data of demographic 
changes, the estimated aggregate saving rates, and the estimated interest payments of 
government bonds. It is of our particular interest whether the current account will turn 
to be negative by the rapid demographic change.    It is found that the IS balances would 
remain positive under a condition that the government bond issues would be 
constrained by fiscal sustainability.   
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1. Introduction 
As the birth rate declines and the average life expectancy increases, the ratio of the 
retired (age 65 and older) to the productive (ages between 15-64), is increasing in most 
advanced countries and some emerging market economies. This is commonly known as 
aging of the society. The speed of aging in Japan is particularly high. In 2000, about five 
productive age people support one retired, but by 2025, only two productive people will 
be supporting one retired, and by 2050 the ratio become 70 percent. 
Aging is expected to have profound impacts on various microeconomic institutions 
and overall macroeconomic activities. To name a few, the aggregate saving rate will be 
affected, the pension system will be adversely affected, the long-term care and welfare 
system has to change, the potential growth rate will be affected, and the current 
account will be affected. 
It is straight-forward to show that aging makes it extremely difficult to maintain a 
pay-as-you-go pension system. As the ratio of the number of pension receivers to the 
number of pension premium paying workers increases, changes have to happen in the 
benefit level, a premium amount, broadening premium paying base, increasing the age 
to qualify pensions, or some combinations of the above. Foreseeing this possibility, 
surpluses in the social security account have been built up in the past, but the current 
surpluses are expected to vanish in the next fifteen to twenty years, even though the 
qualifying age is scheduled to be raised in steps.   
The growth potential will be lowered as less labor input is expected. When the 
population of working age starts to decline, contribution of labor input from the number 
of employees to economic growth turns negative. Hours per worker will decline too, 
contributing to further decline. Unless, the labor productivity increases dramatically, 
overall labor contribution to growth will soon turn negative. Then, unless capital 
accumulation accelerates and total factor productivity increases more than before, the 
potential growth rate will decline. The impact of absence of growth does not only lower 
standard of living, but also create macroeconomic difficulties. The decline in growth rate 
will make it more difficult to grow out of fiscal debt, which has become the worst among 
the G7.   
The life cycle theory predicts that lower population growth rate tends to lower the 
aggregate household saving rate. In a typical life cycle model, working population is 
assumed to save for their retirement. The population ratio of retired to workers becomes 
higher, then the aggregate saving rate will decline. With a lower net saving of household, 
the national saving-investment balance will shift, provided that the corporate and 
government sectors will not change their saving-investment balance. The large current  3
account surpluses that Japan has been recording in the past decades may soon 
disappear due to aging. If that happens, it will have an impact on the global financial 
and capital flows.   
This paper will examine macroeconomic issues associated with aging population in 
Japan. We will attempt to answer the following questions regarding the macroeconomic 
impact of aging: (1) Will aging necessarily lower the household saving rate?; (2) Will 
aging necessarily lower the size of current account surpluses (or turn them negative)?   
 
 
2. Household Saving Rate 
2.1 Impacts of Population Aging 
Japan is going to face the rapid population aging. One important implication of low 
saving rates of the older is that it could lead to the low aggregate savings due to the 
population aging. Figure 1 shows the number of the old (over 65) and that of the young 
(defined as the population of 18 to 64), and their ratio estimated by National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR). As shown in the figure, the number 
of the young has been declining since 2000, the number of the old will almost double 
between 1990 and 2020, and the ratio of the old to the young will be 70% in 2050. 
 




































Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2002) 
Note: The scale of population is on the left axis, and the scale of ratio is on the right 
axis. The ratio = (population of over 65 or more) / (population of 18 to 64), 
including both male and female. 
 
  4
2.2 Savings and Three Statistical Data 
Traditionally, there are three different statistical data sources to infer household 
consumption-saving behavior: (1) the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), 
the Ministry of Public Management, (2) the National Survey of Family Income and 
Expenditure (NSFIE), the Ministry of Public Management, and (3) SNA, have data of 
household saving rates. Since methods of sampling households, and methods to 
estimate disposal income and consumption are different, the household behavior shown 
by these three different data sources bring different results.   
The Ministry of Public Management publishes both the FIES and the NSFIE. Both 
are based on surveys of households. The NSFIE is conducted infrequently but covers 
larger samples with detailed information. The NSFIE survey is based on household 
expenditures and income of 60 thousand households in September, October, and 
November of every 5 years. The FIES survey is conducted frequently—every 
month—with much smaller samples—8 thousand households (9 thousand households 
after 2002).   
There are other differences between the NSFIE and FIES. One-person households 
are included in the NSFIE survey, but not in the FIES survey before 2002. The NSFIE 
has data of income taxes and social insurance premium payments, that are relevant in 
estimating correctly household saving rates with disposable income. 
The FIES or NSFIE, and SNA show quite different movements of saving rates. 
Figure 2 illustrates the saving rates of the FIES and SNA. The SNA saving rate has 
been declining since 1975. On the other hand, the FIES saving rate has an upward 
trend after 1980. The reasons of such a difference is that the FIES does not include the 
imputed values of owner-occupied housing rents, public expenses such as social 
insurances and education, and one-person households. On the other hand, FIES 
















Note: Saving rates are defines as the ratios of savings (net) over disposal income
(net) in SNA. Those in FIES are the ratios of (disposal income – consumption 
expenditure) over disposal income of worker’s households. 
 
2.3 Estimation of Saving Rates 
The FIES and the NSFIE have disadvantages, for example, in capturing the costs of 
house rents, the effects of credit cards. However, data in these statistics have detail 
figures of the ages and types of employment. We cannot analyze the saving rates of the 
different ages with SNA. We use the NSFIE rather than the FIES, since it has an 
advantage of larger samples and has data of one-person households. 
The saving rates based on the NSFIE are estimated following Takayama et. al. 
(1989), Hayashi (1997), and Higo (2001). The basic definition is, 
saving rates = 
disposal income* –living expenditure*
disposal income*    
where * indicates that the variables are estimated, and 
disposal income* = annual income – income tax* – social insurance* 
– other non-living expenditure* 
The data of the income tax and the social insurance are monthly base, so we need to 
transform them into the annual base by multiplying by twelve. Note, the direct income 
tax levies on bonuses so that it is estimates as, 
direct income tax* = annual income × 
direct income tax(per month)
income(per month)    .    6
The expenditures also need to be transferred to the annual bases. Expenditures has 
usually seasonality, thus the multiplier is not twelve but by estimated values so that 
annual expenditure* = estimated multiplier* × expenditure(per month )  .  
Expenditures of the NSFIE are the value of average monthly expenditures only during 
three months from September to November for two or more person households. For the 
one person household, the data is the value of average monthly expenditure during two 
months of October and November. Since the household expenditures usually show 
seasonality, simple multiplying by twelve is not appropriate as annual expenditure. 
To solve this problem, the researches of the existing studies multiply the 
three-month expenditures by the factor estimated from the ten-year averages of the 
three months (September, October, and November) of the FIES, which has monthly data. 
We follow this method. The ten-year averages are from 1991 to 2000 for 1999, from 1986 
to 1995 for 1994, and from 1981 to 1990 for NSFIE 1989. The estimated multipliers are 
generally more than 12.5 and less than 13, for example, that of the workers’ expenditure 
is 12.79. 
Even after calculating disposal income and living expenditure, there still exist some 
problems for estimating a future trend of saving rates. First one is that the data used 
here are categorized according to the ages of household’s head, not to the ages of 
individual family members. Second one is that the accurate saving rates of older cannot 
be estimated because many of them are absorbed in the households of other heads. The 
previous researches do not give figures of age brackets, but we estimate the saving rates 
of age brackets (not households’ heads) in the following sections. 
 
2.4 Saving Rates of the Retired 
The life cycle theory (without bequest motive) predicts that the retired people will run 
down their asset, so that their saving rate (saving/current flow of income) is most likely 
negative. However, according to the statistics (the National Survey of Family Income 
and Expenditure) the households headed by older people (65 and older) show the 
positive saving rate, and the level is sometimes even higher than the young. There are 
two well-known reasons for this apparent anomaly. First, the statistical sampling picks 
up biased samples of retired people as a household headed by older people. Those who 
remain as household head, when they retire, are relatively high income people. They 
may continue working after age 65, and continue to accumulate their assets. Those who 
have little asset and zero working income may be absorbed into the son’s and daughter’s 
household, losing the status of household head. Therefore the saving rate of the retired  7
people as a generation needs to be calculated with some assumptions on the saving 
behavior or retired who are not household heads. Second, even if the bias is adjusted, 
the positive saving rate may be true for the retired generation. This may be explained 
by several factors. They may leave intended and unintended bequests. Intended 
bequests may come from altruistic or dynastic motive. Unintended bequests may come 
from uncertainty on the timing of death. They may also use up saving in the last few 
months of life for hospitalization and expensive medical care. The health care of the few 
months before death may not be captured by household saving surveys.     
The older age people are divided into the four categories of household status, (1) 
head of one-male household, (2) head of one-female household, (3) head of household 
with two or more, and (4) not a head but a member of household. Each is divided into 
two categories, (1) employed and (2) unemployed. As found in the preceding section, the 
behavior of the old age is different depending in the types of household.   
The choice of these household statuses is most likely endogenous. Wealthier and 
working old people tend to maintain an independent household, while those with less 
wealth and income tend to be absorbed in the son’s or daughter’s household. Actually 
89% of the non-head older, who are members of the workers’ households, are 
unemployed and 79% of the member of non-workers’ households in 1999, and 87% and 
84% respectively in 1994. 
 



























Note: Number of household heads is distribution of households multiplying by forty. 
The number of over 65 members is induced by number of under 65 times 65 
over or more 
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To find the average saving rates of old people, we need to estimate the savings rates 
of old people in different categories of household separately. To find accurately the  
living expenditure of the older member of a household headed by the young is almost 
impossible from the NSFIE which has some data of the behavior of the older. Some 
researches, such as Hayashi (1986), Yashiro and Maeda (1994), Nakagawa and Sugou 
(2000) take this problem into account. Hayashi (1986) derive the old ages’ income by 
taking the difference of income or expenditure between households which have the old 
ages and which have not. Nakagawa and Sugo (2000) derived the saving rates of the old 
ages, using micro (individual entry) data of the 1994 NSFIE. 
It is desirable to use micro data but it is not publicly available. Hence we develop 
another method to derive the saving rates of ages, using the ratio of over 65 of 
household which is available in NSFIE of 1989 and after. 
First, we make an assumption of the income of old people (age 65 and older). Since 
the ratio of public pension to total income of non-workers’ in FIES are about 80%, 
1/8=1.25 is used for a blow-up factor. The assumed income of over 65 members are the 
average of public pension benefits of over 65 heads household multiplied by 1.25. Then, 
the income per household of each age bracket’s can be given as multiplying this by the 
over 65 ratio. This method can be justified because most of the non-head older are 
unemployed. Their source of income is limited just to something like the public pensions. 
The estimated income of the older who are members of households is about 1.53 million 
yen in 1999. 
The expenditure from disposable income of over 65 members per household is 
simply assumed as the same ratio as the number of over 65 in household. For example, 
the ratio over 65 in the household headed by 40-44 age old in 1999 is 0.28, and the 
average expenditure is 43 million yen, the expenditure per household of over 65 is 
estimated as 12 million yen (= 0.28 × 43 million yen ). Results of other age brackets are 
presented below in detail.  A first glance at them reveals that the saving rates of the 
old is about 20% or less1.  
 
2.5 Estimation of Saving Rates: Age Brackets 
Next, we investigates the saving rates of other ages. The NSFIE’s categories are based 
on the household heads’ ages. Hence we need to estimate the saving rates not by heads 
but by ages. We have five different types of person in an age bracket. Those are heads of 
one-person households (of employers or non-employers), heads of two-or-more 
                                                  
1  Note, Nakagawa and Sugou (2000) obtains the rate of about 12% (older than 60 years 
old).  9
households (of employers or non-employers), and other than heads. Population of an age 
bracket is equal to the number of total heads plus total members of households. Hence, 
the total number of an age bracket other than heads is by definition,   
Members other than heads of households =   
Age population − Heads of one-person households and of two-or-more households. 
Once we get the number of ages in each household, then we have to consider the 
allocation problem of income. The income of the old has been already described above, so 
that the income of non-head members other than the old is considered here. There are 
two distinguished problems. The first problem is how to treat the income of ages under 
18 who have usually no income but consume. The second one is how to determine the 
rate of allocation to non-head members. We investigate two cases in each problem. 
For the problem of ages under 18, we assume two cases. One case is that the other 
elder ages take burdens of their consumption expenditure according to where ages 
under 18 belong. Hence the households who have children of ages below 18 have extra 
expenditures to support the ages under 1 8 .  A n o t h e r  c a s e  i s  n o t  t o  m a k e  s u c h  
assumption, but assume the ages under 18 take some income from their heads.   
For the problem of allocation, one case is to assume different allocation ratios so 
that a head takes a biggest ratio of income, a spouse takes second biggest, and others 
take smallest ratios. The allocation ratio of income for a spouse2 is one times one over 
the total number of members in a household, and ratios for others are 0.5 times the 
number of others over the total number of members. The head takes the rest of income. 
The NSFIE has average numbers of ages under 18 and ages older than or equal to 
65 in a household. The NSFIE has information on the number of family members under 
age 18, and that of over 65 in a household. The information on age of household head is 
also available. Hence, we can find four categories of ages in a household: (a) an age of 
household head; (b) under 18, (c) over 65, and (d) other ages. The number of other ages 
can be derived by subtracting (1)-(3) from the total number of a household. 
Suppose the number of a household is n, the number of others (18-64 years old) is 
n18-64 and the household’s income is m, then a spouse will take, 
m
n 
Others (18-64 years old) except a husband or a wife will take 
                                                  
2  Mostly, the number of others (18-64 years old) is 1 to 1.8.  10
0.5m(n18-64−1)
n . 
We aggregate all others’ (18-64 years old) income and allocate this aggregate income 
to each age bracket using the ratio of one-person household’s pattern of income level 
across age brackets.   
Another case is just to allocate income proportionally to the number in a household. 
Each member takes same income per person. 
In both cases, each member consumes an amount in proportion to its average 
number in a household. 
The estimated results are shown in Figure 4 to Figure 7. First two figures show the 
results of saving rates in which the income allocation is adjusted depending on their 
character. Next two figures show the saving rates of equal income allocation. Figure 4 
and Figure 6 shows the result of adjustments of ages under 18. Figure 5 and Figure 7 
show the rates of no adjustments under 18. The rates under 18 in them are the implied 
rates from macroeconomic resource restriction so that the saving rates of all are same in 
both cases. 
All figures show that the saving rates are higher in their middle ages and lower in 
younger ages and old ages. The Saving rates over 60 are still not negative.   
Basically, the saving rates are higher in 1999 than in 1994, and higher in 1994 than 
in 1989. However the ages over 60, the trend is quite different. Their saving rates show 
no apparent difference across years. 
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2.6 Simulation of the Household Saving Rate 
As shown in the previous section, the saving rate of the old is lower and the population 
is aging so that the average saving rate is likely to decrease. In this section we simulate 
the future trend of saving rates given the demographic change. Four assumptions are 
important. First, the economic situation including future expectation for the aging or 
taxation may have much impact on the saving rate as seen in the estimation of saving 
rates. The estimated weighted averages of saving rates (with allocation adjustment) are 
23.4% in 1989, 27.9% in 1994, 35.1% in 1999 so that the difference between 1989 and 
1999 is more than 10%. The estimation is limited to the pure effects of aging. Many 
economic factors, such as government behavior, economic situation, and investment 
movements, may change the saving rates. Second the saving rates of households 
depends on taxation (or disposal income) so that if the government reduces the primary 
deficits by imposing taxation, then the saving rates of households which smoothes the 
expenditure will decrease. However, we simply assume other things to be equal to 
analyze the effects of aging alone. To add other things would need to build an ad hoc 
model without appropriate general equilibrium framework.. The weighted averages of 
1999 saving rates are used as bench rates to be stable ever after 2000. The only resource 
of changes in all households’ saving rates is age brackets. 
Data of 1999 and before are from the NSFIE, and the data of 2000 and after are 
from the projection of the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 
2002 which have the projection for 2001-2050. There are 11 age brackets; under 18, 
18-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69 and over 69 years 
old. 
We have estimated the saving rates of workers and non-workers households 
separately, but we make their weighted averages since future trend of workers or 
non-workers cannot be estimated. In the simulation the saving rates of workers’ and 
non-workers’ are averaged by number weights of households. The estimated results are 
in Figure 8. 
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Although life-cycle theory predicts that aging will substantially lower the household 
saving rate, this may not happen in Japan, even after we correct for the bias in the data. 
Retired people in Japan seem to continue saving even after adjusting for a sampling 
bias. If the future older people continue to save like their parents’ generation, then the 
Japanese saving rate may not be lowered too much due to aging. The excess asset will 
be bequeathed, intentionally or unintentionally. It is shown that in our best estimate, 




3. Current Account Surpluses 
3.1 Identity 
Our next task is to examine the impact of the changes in the household saving rate to 
the current account surpluses. First, let us review the national saving-investment 
balance:  
Households’ S腼I + Corporations’ S腼I + Government sector surpluses   
  =  External  sector  surpluses 
where  S stands savings and I stands investments. This is the SNA base identity.  
External sector surpluses in SNA are conceptually the same as the current account 
surpluses in the balance of payment statistics. However, the two can deviate for  15
technical reasons.   
 
3.2 A Model for Simulation 
Here, a model for simulation is presented, but the definitions of variables are shown in 
Appendix 3. The savings and investments of economic agents (households, a 
government, and corporations) are explained in turn. 
Note the difficulty in predicting future trends of the current account lies in 
correlations between investments and savings. The correlations is called 
Feldstein-Horioka puzzle (Feldstein and Horioka (1980)), since the correlation shall be 
small with active international capital transactions. Especially we find that the 
government investments are highly correlated to the corporation’s savings in Japan3. 
Hence we see the corporation’s behaviors from two sides. First, case A is to assume a  




A representative person maximizes the life-time utility given permanent incomes until 














+ ∑  
s.t.  a ht+1 = (1+r) aht + yht – cht – (τt + zt – z’t) 
where Ut is the life-time utility, ut is the instantaneous utility, cht is the household’s 
consumption, aht is the wealth holding at the beginning of period t, a0 is zero, yht is the 
household’s income, τ is tax, z is the social security contribution, and z’ is a transfer 
from government such as public pensions. The transversality condition is satisfied. 
First order conditions give 
 
























  =− − +   ++   ∑∑  
Hence if we adopt the life cycle theory, a household will not leave any bequest to 
                                                  
3  See the appendix 2.  16
their child. However, uncertainty about the permanent income or implicit contracts 
between generations may induce the old to leave intended and/or unintended bequests. 
Since a household tends to receive lower income when young or old, and higher income 
when the household is the middle aged, consumption smoothing behavior will produce a 
lower saving rate for the young and the old, and a higher saving rate for the middle 
aged.  
An important factor is a possible Ricardian behavior. Different assumptions on how 
to treat taxes would lead to different results of the household savings. As shown in the 
preceding analysis, we do not make a particular assumption, but show the possible 
ranges of saving rates according to different scenarios.. 
 
Government 
The government collects taxes, or issues bonds. If we fix the tax rates, then the total 
amount of government revenue is given by, 
Tt = nt (τt + zt) 
where nt is the number of households, τt direct and indirect taxes, zt is social security 
contribution. The expenditure is 
Gt = Cgt + Igt + r Bt-1 + Z’t. 
where Cgt is the government consumption, Igt is the public investment, rt B t-1 is the 
interest payments, and Z’t is the total transfer to households. The difference between 
expenditure and revenue shows the amount of bonds that has to be issued. The IS 
balance of the government sector, ISgt, is defined as   
ISgt = Gt – Tt 
 
Corporations 
The IS balances of corporations and government sectors tend to have a negative 
correlation. Because of the correlation, the IS balance may not be negative by the huge 
government deficits. For example, in 1998, the government deficits was tripled from the 
last fiscal year, but the IS balance was almost the same as the last year since the 
corporations’ IS balance turned to be positive. This correlation may be caused by the 
resource constraint, or demand for investments. Investigation of the mechanism 
required another analysis so that we simply put two assumptions in each case in this 
paper.  17
In the first case (case A), we use the result of regression of the government deficits 
and corporate investment. The IS balance naturally becomes positive since the 
government’s IS balance is negative. However, the huge positive balance cannot be 
sustained because the positive IS balance is resourced by the banking sector whose 
resources are consisted mainly of savings. So the level of positive IS balance is 
constrained so that IS is less than households’ savings.   
ISct = –20,878 – 0.99 ISgt (billion yen)   if ISct < Sh 
ISct = Sht       i f   I S ct ≥ Sht 
where ISc is the IS balance of the corporate sector, Sh is the total households’ savings. 
The intercept (–20,878) and the slope (– 0.99) are just the correlation during last ten 
years. 
In second case (case B) we assume that the  IS balance of the corporate sector is 
constant at 13,105 billion yen since FY2000.   
 
Macroeconomic Identity 
The macroeconomic identity is given by the relationship in that national income Yt  
equals aggregate production, that also equals aggregate expenditure:   
Yt = Dht + Det + Tt = Ct + It + Gt + EXt – IMt 
where Dh is the households’ disposal income, De is the entrepreneurial income. Since the 
actual ratio of Dh to Y is stable, we assume it a constant, and assume government tax 
rates to be constant. Then we can rewrite, 
Yt  =  α Yt + Det +α β Yt 
then, 
Det = (1–α–αβ) Yt. 
where α is the labor share ratio in macroeconomic income distribution, and β is the 
average tax rate. Hence the aggregate savings of economic sectors are, 
St=st Dht = st α Yt 
Set = ε Det =ε (1–α–αβ) Yt. 
where St is the households’ aggregate savings, st is the aggregate saving rate, Se is the 
aggregate entrepreneurial savings, and ε is the stable saving rate of the entrepreneur.  18
Total IS balance of an entire economy is defined by 
ISt = (St–It) + (Set–Iet) + ISg  
= Yt –Ct – It – Gt = EXt–IMt 
The saving rates of the households and corporations are stable, while the 
investments are unstable. As for the investment, it is simply assumed to increase or 
decrease according to the changes in GDP.   
 
GDP and Statistical Discrepancy 
GDP is exogenously given in this paper. The changes in GDP affect the investments, 
consumption, and even government expenditures. Another case is constant in terms of 
GDP per capita. The case of per capita is examined because we expect decreases of an 
entire population and those of working age. 
IS balance has to be equal to the external surpluses, but it is not in reality because 
of the statistical discrepancy. To fill the gap, we add the difference between year 2000 
and 2001 as statistical discrepancy. 
The most important factor in the overall IS balance is the government I-S balance. 
The government sector balance depends on the primary balance (expenditure without 
interest payments minus revenue without debt issues), and interest payments on the 
outstanding debts. Figure 9 shows, the corporations’ or government’s IS balance have 
more variation in trend than the household sector. Although the saving rates of 
households will decline as shown above, the degree of the gross savings decrease due to 
the decline in the household sector turns out to be overwhelmed by small changes in 
assumptions on corporate and government behaviors. 
It is important to note that there is a relationship between household savings and 
government behavior. If the government levies higher taxes, then household savings 
will decline due to the decrease of the disposal income. If the government issues bonds 
instead of raising taxes, then a household may increase savings expecting the future 
increase of tax burden. Since the degree of such effects depends on various factors in 
reality, we just assume a path of the households saving that is not affected by the tax 
increase by interest payments of government bonds. So actual saving rates (ratio to 
GDP) after 2000 will be some ratio between that of “savings/GDP” and that of “(savings 
+ interest payments)/GDP” in the figures.. 
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Note: The sum of internal sectors and the external sector are not always same with 
an opposite sign, because of the statistical discrepancy. 68SNA before 1990, 





We investigate the investment-saving balance with four possible scenarios: (1) primary 
balance scenario, (2) GDP growth scenario, (3) interest rates scenario, (4) GDP per 
capita scenario. Assumptions of these scenarios are described in Table 1. 
 
(1) Primary Balance Scenario 
This is a scenario that the government sector tries to reduce the amount of primary 
deficits gradually, and assumes it to be zero after ten years. The amount of reduction is 
just the same every year. The government’s overall deficits is still not to become zero, 
since it has to pay the interest on the stock of outstanding debts.. The government’s 
expenditure includes the debt repayments which include transfers to the Debt 
Consolidation Fund. Hence we just exclude the interest payments from the debt 
repayments. 
First, Case 1-1 shows a case that the government maintains the primary balance to 
be deficits of the same size in year 2000 that is a benchmark. The first two figures shows 
the case A of the corporations’ IS, which is described in the previous section. The third 
figure shows the IS balance when the corporations’ IS being constant after 2000. 
In Case A, the government deficits show the ever increasing pattern so that use all 
domestic saving resources. The IS balance will be negative after 2039. The case A  20
indicates the net investment of the corporations will be kept to negative. However such 
situation may not be appropriate. Case B shows the constant IS balance of the 
corporations, and in this case, the national IS balance will turn to be negative after 
2029. 
The saving rates change only slightly in many scenarios, but it can decline 
drastically when the government imposes more taxes.   
Case 1-2 is a scenario of different primary balances. If the primary balances are 
restored in 2010, the level of government deficits does not exceed the savings for some 
years.  Then the trend of the IS balance depends also on the corporations’ IS. Because 
of this dependency, the simulated figures show quite different patterns in case A and B. 
If the corporations’ IS negatively correlated then the IS balance will just decrease 
gradually. If the correlation is week, then the balance will decline more rapidly.   
From the two cases, the future trend of IS depends crucially on the government 
behavior. If the government can keep the primary deficits lower, then there is a room for 
IS surplus in Japan.   
However, corporate sector IS deficits were highest in 1990 as shown in Figure 9. The 
deficits were about 40 trillion yen (real).  If corporate investment stays at that level, 
the remaining resources for the government would be limited.   
 
(2) GDP growth scenario 
As the GDP level increases, the household income increases and so will the tax revenue 
for the government.   
Case 2-1 is the scenario of 1% real GDP growth. In this case, the real interest rate of 
the government bonds is assumed to be constant at 1.64% which is slightly bigger than 
the rate of economic growth, 1%. Hence the government IS balance alone may exceed 
the household savings, but whether the national IS balance turns to be negative 
depends on the effects of the corporations’ IS balance. 
Compared to Case 1-1 which assumes no growth, the GDP growth in Case 2-1 
absorbs the negative IS balance of the government by increasing the household    saving. 
Hence the surplus level of IS balance is higher than that of the Case 1-1. However the 
government deficits are still high. If the corporations IS balance can absorb the 
governments deficits, then the IS balance may be positive even in the long-run as in 
Case A. However the government produces a negative influence on the national IS 
balance as in case B. 
If the government can successfully reduce the amount of primary deficits, then the 
IS balance will not be negative with the 1% real growth in the long run as shown in the  21
Case 2-2. In this case the household savaging exceeds the government deficits, hence 
the IS balance is positive in both cases of A and B. 
 
(3) Interest Rates Scenario 
Until now we have assumed the constant interest rates of public bonds, but such an 
assumption is rather optimistic. If the government outstanding debt is accumulated 
then the interest rates will most likely become higher. When the interest rate increases, 
the government IS balance decreases. Cases that the interest rate of the government 
bonds increase gradually to 3% in 2050, with an annual increase by about 0.027% are 
examined in this scenario. 
Case 3-1 analyzes when the government keeps the current primary position, and 
there is no growth. In this case, the IS balance turns to be negative in 2030 in case A, 
and in 2022 in case B. Since we assume that the gradual increase in interest rates, the 
turning point will not come too soon. However an impact of government debts is much 
greater than Case 1-1. The IS balance reaches -60 trillion yen (real) in 2050 even in case 
3-1-A, while -15 trillion yen (real) in 2050 in case 1-1-A. 
Case 3-2 shows the case of 1% growth. In this case, the GDP growth cannot absorb 
the government deficits thus the IS balance is likely to be negative, compared to the 
case 2-1. 
If the government achieves the primary balances in 2010, then the IS balance will 
be kept positive for a while, but the high burden of interest payments will bring the 
negative IS balance in the long-run as in case 3-3. 
 
(4) Constant real GDP per Capita Scenario 
The assumption of GDP in above cases may be irreverent for the aging since the GDP 
may decline as population and working ages decreasing. Hence we assume the GDP per 
capita is constant rather than GDP in this scenario. The average rate of GDP growth in 
fifty years is about –0.46% per year. 
Case 4-1 is a case of constant primary deficits and a constant interest rate. 
Composed to the case 1-1, aging has much stronger impact on the negative IS balance. 
Case 4-2 examines when the interest rates increases, and IS balance is negative in 2028 
in case 4-2-A, and in 2022 in case 4-2-B. Case 4-3 is a case of primary balance. In the 
case 1-2, the IS balance is kept positive at least until 2050. In this case, it turns to be 
negative in 2046 in case 4-3-A and in 2043 in case 4-3-B. 
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Table 1 Assumptions of simulation analyses 
Corporations' IS Primary Balance Real GDP growh Real Interes Rates
AC o r r e r a t e d  t o  G o v n ' t  I S
BC o n s t a n t
AC o r r e r a t e d  t o  G o v n ' t  I S
BC o n s t a n t
AC o r r e r a t e d  t o  G o v n ' t  I S
BC o n s t a n t
AC o r r e r a t e d  t o  G o v n ' t  I S
BC o n s t a n t
AC o r r e r a t e d  t o  G o v n ' t  I S
BC o n s t a n t
AC o r r e r a t e d  t o  G o v n ' t  I S
BC o n s t a n t
AC o r r e r a t e d  t o  G o v n ' t  I S
BC o n s t a n t
AC o r r e r a t e d  t o  G o v n ' t  I S
BC o n s t a n t
AC o r r e r a t e d  t o  G o v n ' t  I S
BC o n s t a n t
AC o r r e r a t e d  t o  G o v n ' t  I S



















































Note: "Constant" indicates that the value is the same as that of FY2000 after FY2000. 
Primary balances are defined as fiscal balance minus interest payments (not debt 
repayments (Kokusaihi)). See also the matrix of results of Table 5 and Table 6. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Aging is an important issue in many aspects of macro-economy. Household savings will 
be significantly affected by rapid aging, if life-cycle theory is applicable. However, it is 
well known that the difficulty exists in estimating, from published surveys, the saving 
behavior of the old age people. We have attempted to make some adjustments in 
estimating how much old age people are really saving in Japan. The old age people in 
Japan do save but the saving rate is lower than the younger middle age groups. 
Assuming that this trait continues in the future, the household saving rate will decline 
with aging. 
It was found that any change in household gross saving due to aging would be 
completely overwhelmed by expected changes in the investment-saving (deficit) balance 
of the government sector. In order to maintain fiscal sustainability, the government 
sector is expected to restore balanced budget. A reasonable assumptions on tax 
increases or expenditure cuts, that are required to restore balanced budget, will 
generate large changes in the overall IS balance.    23
Effects of aging on household sector are important. However, how quickly the fiscal 
balance of the government is restored is at least equally important in thinking of the IS 
balance of the Japanese economy. 
It is theoretically possible to predict that the current accounts (external balance) 
turning negative due to aging through the channel of household saving, if there is no 
adjustment to the government budget deficits.  However, it is not conceivable that it 
would be a case, because it would mean that the fiscal situation will become 
unsustainable. 
Therefore, we predict that a decline in household saving due to aging will be more 
than offset by the smaller deficits of the government sector, thus the current accounts 
will remain positive in the indefinite future. 
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Appendix 1    Comparison of Saving Rates 
We estimate the saving rates of age brackets with several adjustments. We have 
estimated the saving rates by different characteristics in 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999: by 
age brackets—11 age brackets, under 18, 18-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 
55-59, 60-64, 65-69, over 70 or more. However originally data include the household’s 
behavior categorized by age brackets and by working conditions—of workers’ 
households and non-workers households; and by the number of household members—of 
two and more members, and one-person households (headed by male or female). Note, 
the definition of workers household is the household in which the head is employed by 
private corporations or public organization. It does not include the self-employed, such 
as presidents, executives, and even firm houses. Hence non-workers’ households include 
variety types of household, for example, the unemployed and presidents. 
The saving rates from the original data are shown in Figure A- 1 to Figure A- 3. The 
saving rates of two-or-more households show the quite different figure as estimated in 
this paper. Especially the saving rates of the old are higher, and the level is same as the 
young. This indicates that the households with old household heads are relatively rich. 
On the other hand, the one-person households of the older have lower saving rates.   
 






























































Appendix 2    Investment and Government’s Deficits 
As Figure A- 4 indicates, the IS balance of corporations and that of government are 
negatively correlated. The IS balance equals to the financial surpluses or deficits by the 
definition of the macro-economy. If the government issues the bonds, then they are 
bought by the households or the corporation sector, which included the banking sector. 
Actually most of them are bought by the financing sector of the central bank, public 
banks and private banks. The increase in the bond issues bring about an increase in the 
ratio of the government bonds in their assets rapidly in recent years. Figure A- 5 shows 
the ratios. The ratio of the government bonds in the private banks’ assets in 2000 is 2.5 
times of that in 1990.. 
 
 





































Note: Each figure shows the IS balances. 68SNA before 1989, and 93SNA after. The IS 
balances of Corporations and NPOs is on the right hand showing opposite sign. 
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The question is how they are related. One mechanism is just through identity. The 
government deficits have to be absorbed in some sectors including the external sector. 
The difficulty is the allocation problem between the external and the internal. The 
second mechanism is crowding out. The issue of government bonds increases the 
interest rates then it deters the investment. However, recent interest rates of the 
government bonds are actually low. 
We use the correlation during the period from 1990 to 2000. The slope of the 
corporations’ IS to the government’s IS is −0.99, and the intercept is about −20,878 
(billion yen). The results of another regression which analyzes the relationship between 
the corporations’ investment and the issues of the government debts are shown in Table 
A- 1 and Table A- 2. 
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Table A- 1 Estimation of corporations’ investments 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables
Explanatory
Constant 50,721 ** 103,290 ** 3.64 5.00
(5,763) (6,779) (14.60) (3.00)
Bond Issues -0.15 ** -0.12 **
(billion yen) (0.03) (0.03)
d (Bond Issues) -0.59 -0.24 **
(%) (0.41) (0.08)
Dummy for 1990 13,466 ** -32,117 ** -6.57 28.71
(3,963) (4,661) (69.98) (14.39)
Adj. R
2 0.75 0.65 ** 0.01 0.30
DW 1.24 0.80 2.41 2.68
d (Gross
Investment)








Note: d(⋅) indicates the changes(%) from previous year.   
 
Table A- 2 Unit root test 
Augmented
Weighted Symmetric -2.38 -2.29 -2.66
P-value 0.37 0.43 0.20




P-value 0.22 0.81 0.87









Appendix 3    Simulation of IS Balance: Definitions and Assumptions 
This appendix presents the method of the IS balance simulation. In the IS balance, 
private investment of each future year is almost unpredictable. On the other hand, 
saving can be guessed since the saving rate of each age bracket is assumed to be stable. 
The fiscal balance is partly predictable, since the interest payments are from the stocks 
of government debt. Hence, to find the possible IS balance or current account trends, 
the simulation of fiscal balance are the important in addition to the savings. 
We give constant growth rates of the real GDP after 2001. The inflation rate is also 
assumed to be constant, thus the nominal GDP is calculated from these two 
assumptions. 
The household income is defined by Compensation of Employees of the Income and 
Outlay Accounts 
Households’ income (Compensation of Employees) 
=  Disposal Income + Current Taxes   
+ Social Contributions + Net Current Transfers 
From the view point of national income distribution, the ratio of the compensation of 
employees are stable around 80% after 1990. So the employee compensations are 
assumed to be 80% of GDP. Then disposal income can be derived by subtracting taxes 
and social security contributions from compensation of employees. Current tax is about 
9% of GDP, and if the government levies extra taxes then it would be added. 
Others are defined as Entrepreneurial Income,   
Entrepreneurial Income    =  G D P   – Compensation of Employees. 
Though entrepreneurs’ saving rates are not so stable as households’, we assume the 
95.2% of year 2000. Then the entrepreneurs’ total saving is estimated. 
Interest payments in debt-servicing costs are consists mainly of 10-years public debt 
payments. Thus interest payments are give as, 
Interest payments    =    (10-year average market interest rates of 10-years bonds) 
              × (outstanding government debt (end of the previous year)). 
The difference between the estimated interest payments and the actual payments is 
about 15% from actual 10 trillion yen in 2000. The interest rates after 2001 are assumed 
in each case. The total value of debt-servicing costs is estimated by adding public bonds 
issued 10 years before to interest payments. 
Tax revenue is the same amount as taxes paid by household, and a constant tax rate  30
is assumed.    Therefore , tax revenues also depends on GDP.   
Tax revenue    =  Workers’  Income–1 + additional tax 
                 =  Tax  revenue–1 +(current taxes–1 – current taxes) 
Then required amount of bond issues is the difference between revenues and 
expenditures, defined as, 
Public  bonds  issues  =  expenditure (includes debt – servicing costs ) – revenue. 
An outstanding debt of this period is a stock of previous period plus new issues minus 
redemptions. 
Then we have derived all of the components of national IS balance: households 
savings and investments, IS balance of corporation, and the IS balance of Government.  
One problem is that the estimated IS (after 2001) is not consistent before 2000, because 
of the statistical discrepancy. Hence the difference (3,141 billon yen) is added to the 
simulated values.  31
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Table 2 Saving rates by age brackets, all persons, with income adjustments 
1989 1994 1999 1989 1994 1999
   -18    -18  -0.172 -0.090 0.078
18-24 0.091 0.062 0.262 18-24 0.180 0.206 0.371
25-29 -0.041 0.055 0.209 25-29 0.229 0.247 0.335
30-34 0.007 0.160 0.232 30-34 0.392 0.416 0.422
35-39 0.100 0.194 0.272 35-39 0.472 0.512 0.510
40-44 0.285 0.323 0.426 40-44 0.519 0.575 0.625
45-49 0.424 0.412 0.492 45-49 0.529 0.547 0.600
50-54 0.454 0.449 0.499 50-54 0.487 0.500 0.541
55-59 0.420 0.436 0.497 55-59 0.454 0.462 0.511
60-64 0.333 0.339 0.323 60-64 0.415 0.381 0.346
65-69 0.194 0.197 0.191 65-69 0.331 0.261 0.221
70-   0.133 0.172 0.165 70-   0.198 0.202 0.181
(a) Adjustments on Income Allocation,
    and on Ages under 18
(b) Adjustments on Income Allocation,





Table 3 Saving rates by age brackets, all persons, without income adjustments 
1989 1994 1999 1989 1994 1999
   -18    -18  -0.259 -0.174 0.006
18-24 0.253 0.178 0.335 18-24 0.327 0.304 0.434
25-29 0.049 0.121 0.253 25-29 0.296 0.299 0.372
30-34 0.069 0.208 0.273 30-34 0.430 0.449 0.453
35-39 0.103 0.188 0.266 35-39 0.474 0.508 0.505
40-44 0.260 0.292 0.400 40-44 0.502 0.556 0.608
45-49 0.319 0.348 0.439 45-49 0.443 0.497 0.558
50-54 0.319 0.341 0.427 50-54 0.360 0.403 0.475
55-59 0.333 0.360 0.451 55-59 0.372 0.390 0.466
60-64 0.312 0.332 0.308 60-64 0.397 0.374 0.331
65-69 0.081 0.143 0.149 65-69 0.237 0.211 0.181
70-    0.085 0.149 0.151 70-    0.153 0.180 0.167
(a) Non Adjustments on Income Allocation,
    and Adjustments on Ages under 18
(b) Non Adjustments on Income Allocation,





Table 4 Saving rates by age brackets and types, without income adjustments 
(a) One-Person, Worker (b) One-Person, Non-worker
1989 1994 1999 1989 1994 1999
18-24 0.158 0.191 0.194 18-24 0.224 -0.163 0.352
25-29 0.158 0.191 0.194 25-29 0.224 -0.163 0.352
30-34 0.261 0.239 0.249 30-34 0.101 0.257 0.108
35-39 0.261 0.239 0.249 35-39 0.101 0.257 0.108
40-44 0.343 0.368 0.422 40-44 0.296 0.168 0.420
45-49 0.343 0.368 0.422 45-49 0.296 0.168 0.420
50-54 0.268 0.287 0.393 50-54 0.077 0.129 0.199
55-59 0.268 0.287 0.393 55-59 0.077 0.129 0.199
60-64 0.412 0.320 0.239 60-64 -0.021 0.074 -0.023
65-69 0.412 0.320 0.239 65-69 -0.021 0.074 -0.023
70-    0.223 0.117 0.236 70-    -0.002 0.186 0.121
1989 1994 1999 1989 1994 1999
18-24 0.315 0.384 0.380 18-24 0.422 0.490 0.418
25-29 0.445 0.449 0.471 25-29 0.570 0.603 0.523
30-34 0.560 0.562 0.579 30-34 0.641 0.600 0.654
35-39 0.613 0.635 0.647 35-39 0.724 0.692 0.708
40-44 0.579 0.639 0.667 40-44 0.601 0.658 0.699
45-49 0.415 0.518 0.569 45-49 0.486 0.554 0.578
50-54 0.359 0.402 0.455 50-54 0.454 0.447 0.495
55-59 0.383 0.366 0.422 55-59 0.466 0.446 0.487
60-64 0.381 0.328 0.367 60-64 0.434 0.394 0.366
65-69 0.440 0.404 0.451 65-69 0.466 0.447 0.414
70-    0.562 0.490 0.541 70-    0.465 0.435 0.476
1989 1994 1999 1989 1994 1999
18-24 0.354 0.413 0.430 18-24 0.289 -0.019 0.484
25-29 0.354 0.413 0.430 25-29 0.289 -0.019 0.484
30-34 0.433 0.448 0.469 30-34 0.176 0.349 0.290
35-39 0.433 0.448 0.469 35-39 0.176 0.349 0.290
40-44 0.496 0.541 0.592 40-44 0.355 0.271 0.538
45-49 0.496 0.541 0.592 45-49 0.355 0.271 0.538
50-54 0.438 0.483 0.571 50-54 0.154 0.237 0.362
55-59 0.438 0.483 0.571 55-59 0.154 0.237 0.362
60-64 0.549 0.507 0.462 60-64 0.064 0.189 0.185
65-69 0.056 0.123 0.136 65-69 0.150 0.164 0.156
70-    0.056 0.123 0.136 70-    0.150 0.164 0.156
(c) Head, Two-or-More Persons Household,
    Workers
(d) Head, Two-or-More Persons Household,
    Non-Worker
(d) Non-Head, Two-or-More Persons Household,
    Workers
(f) Non-Head, Two-or-More Persons Household,




Table 5    Matrix of Results IS/GDP (%) : Case A 
Purimary balances: Constant since 2000
+  0+  1+  2+  3
0.8 -1.1 -3.3 -6.0
-8.4 -18.9 -33.8 -55.0
3.2 2.4 0.6 -1.4
0.2 -6.2 -15.2 -28.2
4.0 4.1 3.6 2.0
4.8 1.4 -4.1 -12.0
4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7





Real Interest Rate in 2050






















   
Purimary balances: Zero in 2010 
+  0+  1+  2+  3
1.9 2.0 2.1 1.1
1.6 -4.8 -14.9 -30.0
3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2
3.5 2.3 -3.8 -12.9
3.9 3.9 4.0 4.0
4.7 4.8 2.9 -2.7
4.5 4.6 4.6 4.7





Real Interest Rate in 2050























Note: Case A of the Corporations’ IS which is negatively correlated to the governments’ IS. The 
value of a upper row in a cell is the ratio IS balance over GDP in 2025 and the second value is in 
2050. Real interest rates are the values in 2050 which are the values in 2000 (2.32%) plus 
indicated values in top of each column, and gradually increased to that value. Real GDP growth 
is per annual and constant through years. Constant primary balances indicate the same value 
(about −19 trillion yen) through years. Zero in 2010 indicates that primary balances gradually 
close to zero until 2010 and constantly zero after. 
Table 6    Matrix of Results IS/GDP (%) : Case B 
Purimary balances: Constant since 2000
+  0+  1+  2+  3
-1.5 -3.4 -5.7 -8.3
-10.2 -20.6 -35.4 -56.5
0.3 -1.2 -2.9 -4.9
-3.7 -10.0 -19.0 -31.8
1.8 0.6 -0.8 -2.4
0.3 -3.6 -9.1 -17.0
2.8 1.9 0.9 -0.4


























Real Interest Rate in 2050
Year 2000 plus indicated values (%)
   
Purimary balances: Zero in 2010 
+  0+  1+  2+  3
3.9 2.3 0.5 -1.6
-0.4 -7.0 -16.9 -32.0
4.5 3.4 1.9 0.2
2.3 -1.7 -7.8 -16.9
5.0 4.1 3.0 1.7
3.9 1.4 -2.3 -7.8
5.4 4.7 3.8 2.8


























Real Interest Rate in 2050
Year 2000 plus indicated values (%)
 
Note: Cases of constant corporation’s IS after 2000.  36
1. Primary Balance Scenario 
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Note: Case A of the 
Corporations’ IS 
which is negatively 
correlated to the 
governments’ IS. 
Note: Case A of the 
Corporations’ IS.   
Note: Case B of the 
Corporations’ IS 




shows the same 
cases in order.  37
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2. Real GDP Growth Rates 
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3. Interest Rates Increase 
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Case  3-2  Interest  rates  increase to 3% in 2050, 
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Case  3-3  Interest  rates  increase to 3% in 2050, 
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4. Constant real GDP per Capita Case 
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